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The concept of accessing a data base and EDP equipment
located ashore from ships at sea is presented as a complete
system entitled Remote Interrogation Information Exchange
System (RIIXS). The system contains the following elements:
a data base located ashore; an input/output terminal located
aboard ship; and a digital data link, provided by FLTSATCOM,
connecting the two. RIIXS is designed to supply the fleet
commander with operational information vital to command and
control in addition to providing command mobility and rapid
command assumption. RIIXS is evaluated on the following
criteria: reliability; survivability; maintainability;
personnel manning; data transmission rates; dollar cost
resource allocation; and contribution to command and
control. RIIXS is shown to be vastly superior to a similar
system located aboard ship.
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Communications have always played an important part in
military operations. Both strategic planning and tactical
operations have relied very heavily on communications in
the past 200 years of world history. This point is valid
whether in regard to breaking the Japanese cryptic communi-
cations code of World War II or the present system of
communications stations around the world.
The importance of any communications system is its
ability to exchange information between different points
around the world; this information assists the military
commander in making decisions. A military commander has
"command" by virtue of his rank or position. However, he
can have control of a situation only when he has the funda-
mental information governing that situation. The better
information he has, the greater are his chances of effec-
tively controlling the situation. Also, if the information
that he has is valuable, and his enemy does not know that he
has it, then the military commander can have even greater
control over the situation. Valuable information is an
integral part of "Command and Control" in the military.
So far the term "valuable information" has been used
in the discussion without any definition. This is because
information or intelligence means many things to many
military commanders. Therefore, the author has elected to

define the term "valuable information" to include any or
all of the following qualities:
Completeness of the information.
Security of the information.
Timeliness of the information.
Accuracy of the information.
Intelligence on enemy forces.
Intelligence on neutral forces.
Intelligence on own forces.
Since valuable information is an integral part of
"Command and Control," how is it transmitted to the military
commander? Throughout military history the answer has been
some type of "communications system." In the past, many
unsophisticated systems have existed: runners, smoke
signals, gunshots, lights, semaphore, flaghoists, and
HF radio. Some of the examples may seem obsolete, but at
one time each system was "state-of-the-art," and was able
to get valuable information to the military commander.
An accurate definition of a communications system in
terms of military applications would be: "An information
exchange system that is vital to Command and Control."
How many military commanders think of our current communica-
tion system as an information exchange system? Probably
not very many. How many would look at a telephone and
think, "information exchange system"? The point here is
that for too long military commanders in the Navy have

looked at a communications system and all they saw was a
communication system. They have failed to realize that "good
communications" equal "good exchanges of valuable information."
They have failed to realize that a reliable exchange of
information is vital to command and control! If the informa-
tion is not valuable, then there is little reason to exchange
it.
It is hard to get people to change their attitudes or
philosophy without a great deal of time and directed
effort. This is certainly true when it comes to improving
and automating naval communications. In order to sell a
bill of goods, the buyer must first be educated to the
importance of the goods. A step in the right direction would
be to begin calling the Naval Communications System by a
more appropriate name. The Naval Information Exchange
System to Support Command and Control appears to be a more
accurate title. The new phraseology appears even more
accurate when applied to the Navy's satellite program.
Rather than call it the Fleet Satellite Communication
System, call it the Fleet Information Exchange System. In
reality, a satellite does not communicate, but rather it
exchanges information from one point to another.
What is now called the Fleet Satellite Communications
System is really the most sophisticated information exchange
system yet proposed to aid command and control at sea.
Satellites have tremendous information exchange capabilities

and. thus they have tremendous command and control capability
if naval commanders are willing to take advantage of the
situation.
The purpose of this thesis is to narrow these capabili-
ties down to one area. The area under consideration is the
information exchange system directly related to fleet com-
manders at sea. The current command and control philosophy
contends that a fleet commander should be located with the
fleet at sea on a capital ship. In addition, the fleet
commander is given a large staff and limited EDP equipment
to provide him with valuable information for decision making
This concept is not being questioned, but it should be
noted that when new equipment is brought aboard a ship,
certain other equipment must be removed. In certain
instances in the past, this has meant the removal of
ship's armament and crew's living spaces.
Normally there is only one flag ship in a numbered
fleet. If this ship sustains battle damage and is lost
to the fleet commander, the Admiral loses the use of his
information exchange system and so does the fleet. That
is to say, a numbered fleet can lose its valuable decision
making assets without losing its commander. The loss of
these assets would imply a tremendous loss in command and
control effectiveness.
During the age of sail, a fleet commander was primarily
concerned with what he could see from horizon to horizon.

If he could not see it, it did not bother him. This situation
existed because once a ship was sighted on the horizon,
it might take as much as half a day of sailing to get close
enough for engagement. Because of the nature of the weapons
involved and the time span taken to employ them, a fleet
commander had ample opportunity (often measured in hours)
to appraise his enemy and take the appropriate action.
Admiral Nelson realized the importance of communications
to command and control even when the movement of his fleet
depended on the wind, and the range of his cannon was not
much more than a mile. He modified Britain's elementary
flaghoist signaling system and parleyed with his captains
prior to major sea battles [Ref. 11]. He realized the
importance of command and control in the thick of a major
sea battle and took great pains to communicate his battle
objective to his captains prior to a major sea battle. The
important point to remember here is that Nelson used and
depended on the most reliable state-of-the-art communications
available to him at the time for success at sea. His most
remembered flaghoist was the one he raised while engaging
the French and Spanish at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805:
"England expects that every man will do his duty." [Ref. 11].
Little had changed in the way of communications from
Nelson's era up to the time of World War II except for the
advent of radio, flashing light, and a more sophisticated
flaghoist code. World War II saw the development and
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deployment of radar for the first time in naval warfare.
Radar expanded a sea commander's area of immediate concern
to a distance slightly over the horizon. Considering the
relatively slow speed of attacking aircraft (200 knots)
and attacking ships (30 knots) , the fleet commander was
still able to prepare his defenses after the enemy was
detected. Preparation time was often measured in minutes.
Preparation was accomplished by disseminating valuable
information to his own forces about the enemy, the most
basic of which was the speed, altitude, direction, and
number of enemy aircraft or ships. But still a fleet
commander's area of immediate concern could be measured by
a few hundred miles.
At that time, communications for command and control
was still a very limited concept. In fact, communications
had a major impact on the outcome of World War II in that
the enemy's own communications were used against him. The
breaking of the Japanese cryptic code early in the war had
monumental effects on the outcome of the war. Two very
dramatic examples of these effects were: (1) The very
successful sea battle at Midway where the Japanese lost
four aircraft carriers and a large number of their veteran
carrier pilots. (2) The second example was the shooting
down of the airplane that contained the senior Japanese
admiral at the time, Admiral Yamamoto, by several Army
Air Corps pilots early in the war. The loss to the Japanese
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was equivalent to the loss of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
to the United States had that occurred.
During World War II, the importance of communications
grew, but its importance to command and control was still a
very limited viewpoint. The quality and reliability of HF
radio left a great deal to be desired in the eyes of many
fleet commanders. At times it was even considered a luxury,
not to be depended upon, and certainly not good enough to
base the survivability of a fleet on.
The weapons of modern warfare have changed drastically
since World War II. These weapons have placed a tremendous
burden on the fleet commander to maintain the survivability
and combat readiness of his fleet. His area of immediate
concern is no longer just over the horizon. His area of
concern is now the whole ocean in which he sails and the
countries that border it. The threat to his force is no
longer limited to snorkeling submarines a few thousand
yards away or 200-knot aircraft a couple of hundred miles
away. The enemy may be a whole continent away; he can
track the fleet's movements with surveillance satellites,
and launch ICBM's with nuclear warheads at a task force.
It is possible for the enemy to strike without ever being
detected because of "over the horizon capability" weapons.
A fleet commander may have a warning of only a few seconds
prior to an enemy attack. Such short notice is not enough
time to prepare a defense, therefore, necessitating
constant preparedness. In addition, the number of
12

independent countries in the world has more than doubled
since the beginning of World War II, adding greatly to the
number .of special political situations that a fleet
commander must be aware of.
The sphere of influence and the number of special
requirements that a fleet commander is responsible for is
infinitely greater now than ever before. Neither he nor
his staff is capable of committing to memory all the items
of information that he is responsible for. Therefore, some
time of recording and filing system must be maintained to
aid the fleet commander in making decisions. Additionally,
the file system must be updated periodically, and easily
accessible for retrieval of information.
It should be apparent that the number of present-day
special situations dictates that a fleet commander needs
a staff and some type of file system to accomplish his
job effectively. The next question that arises is where
to place such a file system. Historically, the file system
has always been placed aboard ship because of the ease
and timeliness with which information could be retrieved.
Recently though, these files have grown so large and
complicated that costly EDP equipment is required to do the
job effectively. As an example, Integrated Flag Data
System (IFDS) was placed aboard the USS Providence for test
and evaluation purposes. IFDS alone required a staff of
about 40 specially trained personnel, several million
dollars worth of computers, and display equipment, as well
as a substantial part of the ship's combat spaces.
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The decision to place IFDS aboard ships was based
primarily on the fact that such a location provided the
greatest reliability of getting valuable information from
the file system to the fleet commander to use in making
decisions. Updating of the files still relied on HF
radio and in-port periods. The accuracy and, therefore,
the usefulness of IFDS relies on the ability to update
data files with current information. HF radio offers
timeliness compared to in-port periods but data rates and
accuracy are poor, even under optimum conditions. In-port
periods, on the other hand, offer improved accuracy and
increased data transfer rates, but timeliness is sacrificed.
With the introduction of Fleet Satellite Communications
(FLTSATCOM) to the Naval Communications System in 1975,
a reliable high-speed data transfer system will be available
for use in updating file systems on a real-time basis.
But before that idea is pursued in any great detail, the
ramifications of such a decision need to be analyzed.
First, EDP-type file systems can be placed only on
large ships such as CVA's, LPH's, LHA's, LCC's and CLG's
due to the space and people required for the equipment. By
1975, all the cruisers in the Navy's inventory will be
more than 20 years old. Can it be justifued to place a
multi-million dollar EDP-type file system on a ship already




Secondly, the placement of a file system on a ship
makes that ship an extremely high-value target to the enemy.
The high-value target does not refer to the fleet commander
aboard, but rather to the highly specialized equipment
aboard. The objective of the enemy will be to eliminate
that equipment from the fleet and not necessarily eliminate
the commander.
To bring this point to light we can recall a very
important part of American history. During the War of 1812,
Commodore Perry was given the task of defending the Great
Lakes against British attack. In 1813, the British did
attack and Commodore Perry resisted the attack with a
small fleet of sailing vessels. During the course of the
battle, his flagship, the Lawrence
,
was completely disabled.
Perry was able to escape with his "colors," row to another
ship in his fleet and successfully carry on the battle.
After the battle, he sent his now famous message, "We have
met the enemy and they are ours,.." [Ref. 11]. By soundly
defeating the British on Lake Erie in 1913, Perry was able
to protect the United States northern flank for the rest of
the war and this fact contributed significantly to the
outcome of the war.
Back in 1813, command and control was represented by
the fleet commander and his "colors." Today, and more so
in the future, command and control will rely heavily on
elaborate EDP and communication systems. If Commodore Perry
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had been relying on an EDP file system, he would not have
been able to carry his primary command and control system
to another ship in the thick of battle and probably would
have lost the battle.
If placing the file system afloat has these significant
drawbacks, where should it be placed? The obvious alterna-
tive is to place the system ashore at a secure naval station;
this alternative provides many significant advantages which
can be realized in all areas of operations. A high-speed
data link between the fleet commander at sea and the shore
station can be used to communicate accurate information to
the fleet commander at sea in a timely manner. A dedicated
data channel in a synchronous communication satellite located
between the two points could provide such a high-speed data
link.
To be able to get information from a computer, the user
must access the computer through some type of input/output
terminal. This applies whether the user is standing next
to the computer or whether the computer is a thousand
miles away. In any case, a reliable communication path must
exist between the users' terminal and the computer. With
the introduction of the FLTSATCOM system in 1975, such a
path will exist. This thesis will examine the concept of
interrogating computer data files from various remote
terminals around the world. Such a concept is called a
Remote Interrogation Information Exchange System (RIIXS)
[Ref. 15]. This idea is not a new one, but to date, no great
16

emphasis has been placed on this idea by the Navy. The
objective of this thesis is to develop and expand the
concept of Remote Interrogation Information Exchange
and to propose a system that could be implemented as a
subsystem to the Navy's FLTSATCOM program.
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II. REMOTE INTERROGATION INFORMATION
EXCHANGE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A. INTRODUCTION
Remote Interrogation Information Exchange System (RIIXS)
•is a command and control data processing system designed
to support numbered fleet commanders (NFC's), at sea or
ashore, during the 1975-1985 time span. RIIXS is a concept
based on the information exchange capabilities of the Navy's
FLTSATCOM program. Since RIIXS is primarily a concept
of information exchange between two different points in
the world, it is flexible to change and can meet various
requirements as set forth by the NFC's. Through the use of
modern EDP procedures and the high-speed data links pro-
vided by FLTSATCOM, it will be possible for a fleet commander
to place his bulk files ashore and access them through remote
terminals. This is the concept of interrogating information-
al files from remote terminals which will be called "RIIXS"
throughout the remainder of the thesis.
B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
RIIXS can be considered divided into three main areas:
(1) the fleet commander's interrogating terminals and dis-
play equipment; (2) the computers ashore with their bulk
data files; (3) the transmission path between the two
,
through which the information will be exchanged. Each one
of these areas will be discussed briefly at this time.
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Details will be brief due to the fact that only the
capability for certain families of equipment is presented
without regard to specific types. Certain equipment will
be common to all RIIXS users while other types may be
unique to the various NFC's.
1 . Central Data Control Center
The author has elected to call. the shore aspect of
RIIXS the Central Data Control Center (CDCC) . Optimum
placement of the control center should be at or near a
FLTSATCOM ground terminal. In this way, information can
be relayed quickly, reliably, and in large volumes to the
NFC via the FLTSATCOM ground terminal. Secondly, the
control center should be located in an area where the NFC
has some sphere of influence. Considering the construction
of just two CDCC's, optimum placements could be in NCS
Honolulu and NCS Norfolk.
The heart of the control center will be a computer
designed to store and retrieve large volumes of data
located in files. In addition to the CPU, a large array of
peripheral storage equipment will be required. Included in
this equipment will be magnetic tape, disc, and drum files.
Particular use will depend on the frequency that information
changes within the files and the frequency with which the
NFC will require the information. (See Figure 1.)
Additionally, the CDCC will contain a number of
visual display units and high-speed printers with which






































to the control center will pass through a specially-
designed communications computer. The communications
computer will be separated from' the main CPU by some type
of buffer which will permit the main CPU to operate with-
out becoming "input or output bound." The main purpose
of the communications computer will be to document and
forward all requests to the main CPU in a timely and
orderly fashion. The main CPU will then answer the requests
from the information contained in its files. Once the infor
mation is retrieved, it is dumped into a buffer. The
communications computer then retrieves the information
from this buffer, completes documentation, and sends the
information to the NFC via the FLTSATCOM ground terminal.
The CDCC should be maintained by personnel trained
in the computer-communications field. Since the CDCC is
ashore, civilian personnel may be employed in many areas.
Also, much of the equipment could be standard manufacture
design without expensive MILSPECS. The senior officer in
the CDCC should be knowledgeable in the area of computer
operations and should also be assigned as a member of the
NFC's staff in a detached status.
2 . NFC Interrogation Terminal
The NFC's Interrogation Terminal (NFCIT) is
basically an information exchange subsystem terminal,
located in one of the ship's compartments. On designated
flagships the compartment will be specially designed to
accommodate all necessary equipment and to facilitate the
21

display of requested information for the NFC. Among the
more important pieces of equipment required will be several
visual display units that can produce both graphics and
alphanumeric information on their screens. At least one
high speed printer will be needed to print out alphanumeric
information received from the CDCC. In addition, it is
recommended that a minicomputer be available to supply a
limited memory capability to provide for emergency
situations and also reduce redundant queries to the CDCC.
Storage capacity can be located in the NFCIT or maintained
in another compartment. (See Figure 2.)
Information in and out of the NFCIT will be in
digital form and be transmitted to the ship's communication
center by coaxial cable. Outbound information will be
passed through the appropriate modems and basic FLTSATCOM
transmit/receive equipment. Once the information leaves
the NFCIT in proper digital format, responsibility for
accurate and timely transmission of the data to the proper
CDCC rests with the FLTSATCOM Information Exchange Systems.
3. Information Exchange Path
The path through space that the information will be
exchanged between the CDCC and the NFCIT is really the simplest
and most basic section of RIIXS. The successful operation
of the information exchange path relies completely on the
operation of the FLTSATCOM system as outlined in SOR 32-18






































by the NFC in the time span, quantity, and quality required
can be supplied only by digital transmissions in the UHF and
SHF frequency spectrum via synchronous communication
satellites
.
UHF and SHF are basically line-of-sight frequencies
that have a very high data carrying capacity when compared
to HF radio. The main drawback to them is that transmission
characteristics are basically in a straight line. This
means that the receiver and transmitter have to be capable
of seeing each other for successful communications to occur.
It is anticipated that there will be very few occasions
when the CDCC and NFCIT are in a position for line-of-
sight communication. Therefore, a synchronous satellite
(or satellites) located approximately 22,500 miles above
the earth is needed to act as a relay vehicle between
two points. on earth. (See Figure 3.) At this altitude,
a single satellite can cover approximately one-third
of the Earth's surface for line-of -sight communications.
Three such satellites can provide world-wide communication
capability between any two points except for the polar
regions. This basic communication capability will be
available to the RIIXS concept with the implementation
of FLTSATCOM in 197 5.
The data to be transferred between the CDCC and
the NFCIT will be in digital form. Both still-frame graphics
and alphanumeric text will be capable of being transmitted














in the satellite, RIIXS will operate in a time sharing
mode. This means that at some instant in time the NFC
cannot use RIIXS due to user saturation of the satellite's
bandwidth. This time span of inoperation is considered
small and tolerable for system operation. Once the NFC
is able to secure a channel of the satellite's frequency
he cannot be pre-empted by any other user.
C. PRIMARY RIIXS FUNCTIONS
As has been stated earlier, the ability for a fleet
commander to make decisions concerning fleet operations and
national security depends on the information available to
him. Communicating proper information to an NFC is a
critical command and control function along with the proper
format and timeliness with which the NFC receives the
information. As an example: If an NFC wants to know the
location of his fleet oilers, he does not want a complete
file listing all ship locations; he wants a one- or two-page
printout naming the ships concerned and their last reported
location. If he wants to know whether or not a certain
ship has an ASW capability, he does not want a whole file
listing every ship in the. fleet with an ASW capability;
rather he wants a single printout naming the ship, stating
whether it has an ASW capability or not, and if so, the
weapon systems aboard.
The responsibility for the timeliness and accuracy of
information will hinge on three major factors: (1) original
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arrangement of the files at the CDCC ; (2) type of EDP
equipment used for correlating the information; (3) an
officer in charge of the CDCC capable of validating the
information being sent out in response to NFCIT queries.
RIIXS performs three main functions in supporting the
NFC. These are: (1) Information collection and maintenance;
(2) Information retrieval and correlation; (3) Information
display.
Information collection and maintenance : is responsible
for the collection, validation, and recording of information
in the proper files. Validating and updating information
already recorded in files on a periodic basis is considered
a prime responsibility of maintenance.
Information retrieval and correlation : is responsible
for retrieving the information germane to NFCIT queries
and correlating tiiat information down to the smallest
possible format. The officer in charge of the CDCC will
be of prime importance to the success of RIIXS. This is a
major reason why the officer in charge of the CDCC should
be a staff member of the NFC concerned.
Information display : can be in either of two forms
:
visual display or high-speed printout. The NFCIT should
be capable of displaying the same information in either
format. Additionally, the CDCC will have duplicate display
equipment as that in the NFCIT. In this way, it will be
possible for the OIC of the CDCC to monitor all information
transmitted to the NFC in the exact same format.
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D. RIIXS DATA BASE
The information contained and the way the information
is organized within the data base is of prime importance
to the success of RIIXS. The primary objective of the CDCC
is the storage and organization of information into a data
base that can respond quickly and accurately to queries
from the NFCIT. The author sees three main areas of
information that should be contained in the data base:
general and administrative type information; information
on NFC's operational forces; and information on other than




1. General and Administrative Type Information
Personnel records to include pay and leave
accounting data.
Visitor clearance, including VIP's and
engineering consultants.
Index of Navy notices and recent directives.
Oceanographic and meteorological data.
EMCON contingency plans.
Electronic and acoustic signature files on
ships and individual equipment, including both
foreign and U.S. fleet units.
Requirements of major treaties with nations
in the NFC's operating area.




Mission capabilities and limitations of
individual fleet units to include, but not





Identification and location of all fleet
units at any given time or projected time
in the future.
Ability to determine individual fleet unit
capability for continued operations after
sustaining battle damage.
Special reports of fleet units such as OPSTAT,
FORSTAT, MOVREP's, CASREPT's, SITREP's, etc.
Location and status of all support elements
under jurisdiction of the NFC.
Ability to determine the most appropriate
unit for future task assignments based on
location and capabilities of all fleet units.
3. Intelligence on Other Forces in the NFC's Operating
Area
Location, identification, and capabilities of
all air and naval forces to include friendly,
unfriendly, and neutral units in the operational
area
.
Foreign air and naval orders of battle.
Direction from which hostile action is
most likely to occur.
Special files on geographic and political
happenings that are classified as "sensitive
situations .
"
The above list of requirements is not designed to be the
total informational package contained by the CDCC, but
should be considered general guidelines. The three main
information headings, Administrative, Operational, and
Intelligence, should be considered a good beginning to the
organization of the CDCC data as direct support to the NFC.
E. RIIXS EQUIPMENT
During normal operations, RIIXS may be spread out over
several thousand miles. Therefore, the equipment must be
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classified by geographic location as well as operational use.
Basically RIIXS is a computer-oriented data base serving a
designated remote terminal through a communication link; and





The communication link is the means with which
information is exchanged back and forth between the data
base and the designated terminal. The actual link is to
be provided by FLTSATCOM' s system of satellites,
ground stations, and terminal equipment aboard ships.
All information will be transmitted in digital form as
specified by FLTSATCOM requirements. This digital informa-
tion will originate from the NFCIT, be directed to the ship's
communication spaces, pass through the necessary buffers
and modems and then transmitted to the proper FLTSATCOM
satellite. This satellite will then relay the information
to the proper FLTSATCOM ground station, through its
buffers and modems, and then transmit it to the CDCC. The
communication link just described (from NFCIT to CDCC) will
rely entirely on the equipment in the FLTSATCOM system as
designated in SOR 32-98 dated July 1972.
2
.
Central Data Control Center
The Central Data Control Center (CDCC) is the data
base which must supply a designated terminal with designated
information. The volume and type of information that must
be supplied in a quick response mode necessitates the use
30

of modern EDP equipment. It is envisioned that three
computers will be necessary. As was mentioned earlier, a
separate communications computer is needed to handle
message traffic. A main computer is needed for the actual
processing, information retrieval, and data base updating.
A third computer should be available as a back-up and be
capable of taking over in the event of a failure in either
one or both of the two primary computers. The main CPU's
should be designed to work in a time sharing mode either
independently or in unison.
In addition to computer hardware, various peripheral
equipment will be necessary for successful operations. The
exact model types and numbers are such that they should
be specified at a high command level. Nevertheless, it
is possible to generalize the type of equipment needed to
















3. Number ed Fleet Commander Interrogation Terminal
The Numbered Fleet Commander Interrogation Terminal
(NFCIT) is to be considered a remote terminal with the sole
purpose of supporting the NFC with command and control infor-
mation. Therefore, the equipment necessary to fulfill this
requirement can be reduced to basic input/output terminals
and various display units. Additionally, a small computer
with limited storage capacity will be required. The storage
i
capability could be availabe in several forms: magnetic
core, tape or disc.
The input/output terminals will be operating at 2400
bps so it is anticipated that not more than two, with one
as a back-up will be needed. Display units could include
any combination of teletype, high-speed printers, and visual
display units. The following equipment should be specified








Scheduling and sequencing of message inputs will be a
manual process. Also, all message queries will be assigned
a precedence in accordance with current naval directives.
The NFCIT ship's communication center will then process the
message queries based on the assigned precedence.
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III. RIIXS EVALUATION CRITERIA
A. INTRODUCTION
The true value of a system to the Navy should be measured
by a set of standards of some type. The author has chosen
seven basic subject areas to use as criteria for evaluating
RIIXS. The seven areas are: reliability, survivability,
maintainability, personnel manning, data transmission rates,
dollar cost resource allocation, and contribution to command
and control.
The use of satellites for information exchange purposes
is new to the Navy and it is still relatively new to civilian
organizations, such as COMSAT. This newness factor makes it
extremely difficult to estimate concrete numbers or dollar
figures for evaluation purposes. Even if numbers were cal-
culated, they could be misleading because of what was and
what was not included. A trite but often used expression
may be appropriate at this time: "Figures don't lie, but
liars figure.
"
As an example, assume that it is necessary to estimate
the annual costs involved in operating a naval communica-
tion station in the continental United States (CONUS) . Some
of the more obvious costs would be: salaries of military
and civilian personnel, cost of utilities, maintenance on
the building and grounds, maintenance on radio equipment,
and general administrative costs. But what about other
33

costs? For example, there would be training costs for
both military and civilian personnel, lost service time to
the Navy due to travel and proceed time in connection with
orders, computed retirement pay of both military and
civilian personnel, cost of maintaining a supply system to
support the station, construction and modernization costs
amortized over a five-, 10-, or 20-year period. These are
all valid costs that have to be included, but to do so
on a fair and equitable basis would be difficult indeed.
To carry the example a little further, political situations
and instability with foreign countries must be considered.
What about an overseas station? How are expensive moving
and cost of living allowances to be figured in? What about
currency revaluations and the balance of payments problem for
foreign employees and American families living overseas?
What are the costs associated with supplying a station on
foreign soil with the necessities of life in time of war
as well as in peace? What is the cost of political
instability in connection with an American NAVCOMSTA
located on foreign soil? What special political situations
may arise from such a situation? When a statement is made
that it costs X dollars to run a communication station for
one year, has the statement not created more questions
than it has answered?
For reasons stated above, the author has elected to
avoid precise statements of numerical estimates except in




For the purpose of this thesis, reliability pertains
to RIIXS hardware and the failure that may occur therefrom.
Briefly defined, reliability will be considered the mean
time between failures on system equipment under normal
operations. RIIXS has three major areas critical to over-
all system reliability: CDCC, NFCIT, and the communication
path between the two.
1. CDCC
Since everything in the world is relative, the most
important part of an evaluation are the relative compari-
sons made with other "knowns" in the same area of operation,
At the present time, there is nothing similar to the RIIXS
Central Data Control Center in operation. The closest
system that can be used for comparison is the now defunct
Integrated Flagship Data System (IFDS) that had been aboard
the USS Providence for approximately one year. IFDS was an
R$D type ship/shore/ship data link system similar to the
proposed RIIXS system. The major difference is that the
computers, operating personnel, spare parts, display and
other supporting EDP equipment were placed aboard the
Providence
. This is in contrast to RIIXS where the EDP-
file system is placed ashore.
Computers that are placed aboard ship are placed
in a hostile environment and therefore have to have
additional military specifications that are normally
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custom made to compensate for the unusual operating
environment. They have to be designed to take the constant
ship vibration, additional G-forces due to pitching and
rolling, and occasional power shortages.
Based on the author's operational experience at
sea and computer operation experience, the following
assumptions appear reasonable. Dollar for dollar a computer
system ashore could be built to have a higher system
reliability than one placed aboard ship given a fixed
computing power. Or, stated another way, any computer
system that can be placed aboard ship should be capable of
being duplicated ashore at either a lower price, a higher
system capacity, a higher system reliability, or some
combination of the three.
Experience with NTDS has shown that to achieve a
certain level of system reliability, less sophisticated
computers have to be used for shipboard systems as com-
pared to shore-based systems. This is indicated by the use
of second-generation computers aboard ships while third-
and fourth-generation computers are used ashore. Therefore,
it is reasonable to state that for the same level of sophis-
tication, a higher reliability factor, as measured by mean
time between failure, can be expected from shore-based
computer systems as compared to shipboard systems.
2. NFCIT
The fleet commander's interrogation terminal aboard
ship will consist mostly of unsophisticated electronic
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equipment, the major exceptions being the minicomputer and
visual display units. This equipment is small enough to
allow for duplication to provide the desired reliability-
factor. The simplest piece of equipment will be a standard
teletype that can be replaced by any one of the several
that are normally found aboard large ships. Input/output
terminals, high-speed printers, and modems are normally




The communication path between the CDCC and the NFCIT
is the critical link in RIIXS. And since RIIXS is proposed
as a subsystem to FLTSATCOM, the reliability of the communi-
cation path depends largely on the reliability of FLTSATCOM
itself.
FLTSATCOM has been designed as a satellite communi-
cation system to be a quick follow-on to certain military
R$D satellites such as TACSAT 1 and LES 6 [Ref. 12]. There-
fore, it appears logical to compare reliability figures
gained from these R$D satellites and COMSAT against relia-
bility figures from current HF radio operations. Of
course, the comparisons will not be exactly fair to the
satellite system because HF holds the advantage in total
dollars spent on R§D, modification expenditures, length of
time in fleet operational experience, and redundancy of




COMSAT has found, and with very few exceptions,
that once a satellite is placed into orbit, it will either
work perfectly for its designed life period or it will not
work at all. That is to say that once a satellite has
started functioning properly, it will continue to do so
for a period approximating its designed life period. On
the other hand, if the satellite fails to start functioning
properly within six months after launch, it probably never
will. With very few exceptions, the military has had the
same experience with its satellites.
HF radio communications is not quite this cut and
dry. A particular radio path may exist between two users
at one time of the day and may not exist at the same time
the next day. Both users have to be continually searching
the frequency spectrum to obtain a continuous HF radio
link. If both users are mobile, the situation gets worse,
and establishing a continuous HF radio link becomes much
more difficult.
The concept of RIIXS is based on a reliable communica
tion link between a mobile terminal at sea and some type of
data file ashore. To date, a great preponderance of infor-
mation indicates that HF radio cannot be used to transmit
digital information over large distances in a continuous
and reliable manner as required by RIIXS.
Current COMSAT operations have shown that digital
communications are very reliable in the SHF spectrum using
t,R

communication satellites as the relay station between a
large number of users separated by thousands of miles.
Until recently, it was thought that FLTSATCOM
operating in the UHF spectrum would enjoy the same
reliability factor between users. But recent tests involving
TACSAT 1 have indicated that UHF signals are affected by
ionospheric scintillation. The final results of the tests
have not been published yet, but it does appear that
scintillation effects are more significant than originally
thought. A preliminary report on the tests indicates that









Sight elevation angle to the satellite
Under worst-case situations, scintillation effects
can cause power fades as high as 6 db to 12 db ; however,
power fades this serious were not found to last longer than
five or six seconds [Ref . 5] . It should be noted that under
similar worst-case situations of sunspot activity, time of
day, and time of year that HF radio communications over





The survivability of the RIIXS communication path is .
a very critical factor to the overall system. For the
purpose of this thesis, survivability is considered the
ability of a system to withstand hostile enemy action. In
this way, a clear distinction can be made between surviva-
bility and reliability.
Communication satellites have received a great deal of
criticism because of the apparent ease with which they
can be neutralized. This fact is basically true of FLTSATCOM
when analyzing the four satellites by themselves. However,
compared to the complete Naval Communication System (NCS)
and all its redundant communication stations, the facts
look a bit different. There are two ways to view the
comparison. The first is to reduce the total number of
NAVCOMSTA's to four to be on a par with the number of
FLTSATCOM satellites or, second, to increase the number of
satellites to 23 to be on a par with the number of
NAVCOMSTA's.
If it were possible to accurately calculate the cost
of reconstructing all 23 NAVCOMSTA's and figure annual
operating costs for five years, the total cost would
probably not vary significantly from the cost of launching
23 communication satellites with a life span of five years
each. Additionally, if information transfer capability
and reliability factors were taken into account, the actual
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amount of information transferred per dollar would probably
prove to be less with the satellite system than with the
HF system.
1 Until proven otherwise, the author will assume
that a one-for-one exchange ratio between satellites and
NAVCOMSTA's is reasonable in comparing the survivability of
a satellite system to that of an HF system.
In order for a potential enemy to physically destroy
a satellite he has to launch some type of space vehicle
to accomplish the job. If this enemy wants to destroy all
our satellites at the same time, then he has to launch at
least as many space vehicles as we have satellites.
Depending on the degree of success he desires, he may have
to launch two or three space vehicles per satellite or
else spend a great deal of money in making each one very
sophisticated. Additionally, the enemy may want to destroy
our satellites covertly vice overtly, further complicating
his problem and adding even more time and expense to his
project. Depending on the methods the enemy uses to destroy
the satellites, he probably will be forced to expend as
many dollars to destroy the satellites as it would cost
to build and launch them.
As far as a NAVCOMSTA is concerned, there are
numerous ways in which they could be rendered useless by
an enemy force, and a majority of them would involve
expenses substantially less than the cost of a space vehicle




As an example, it would not be very difficult to cut the
underwater cables connecting Hawaii and Guam by covert
means. Destruction of CONUS NAVCOMSTA's would probably
be more dramatic, but also could be accomplished by covert
means. If American citizens voluntarily blow up banks,
it seems more than reasonable that a financial reward would
motivate them to render useless several of the more impor-
tant communication stations in CONUS. NAVCOMSTA's located
on foreign territory always risk the potential of damage
by disgruntled nationals. It is reasonable to assume that
a dedicated group of personnel, financed with several
million dollars could knock out every NAVCOMSTA in the
world within a few minutes of each other using conventional
weapons
.
The second major fault of satellites is the ease with
which they can be jammed. This statement must be
qualified because it is possible to provide satellites
with certain anti-jam features. At the present, these
features are expensive and tend to reduce the overall
information exchange capacity of the satellite. But it is
expected that advances in technology will tend to eliminate
these drawbacks within the foreseeable future.
In order to jam a satellite, the enemy has to make a
certain investment in a ground station with enough trans-
mitting power to overpower the desired incoming signal
from U.S. forces. Also, it is impossible to accidentally
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jam a communication satellite; this means national policy
could state that any attempts at jamming U.S. satellites
would be taken as an act of hostility.
Jamming of HF radio signals would generally take more
assets than jamming a comparable number of satellites.
But it would be possible to "legally" jam HF radio without
being considered an act of war in terms of contemporary
standards
.
Two very simple and inexpensive methods could be
employed for HF jamming. The first would be to drop large
amounts of chaff over certain land masses or oceans. The
end result would be to neutralize certain American forces
by eliminating their communication capability. Or the enemy
may want to conceal his own operations behind a protective
wall of chaff. The second means that could be employed
would simply be for the enemy to transmit his routine
messages in the U.S. military frequency spectrum. Although
all of the U.S. messages would not be jammed, a substantial
number would be rendered useless.
An added feature to the satellite system would seriously
complicate the enemy's solution to physical destruction of
the satellite. This feature would be the addition of three
specially synchronized satellites; these three satellites
would be in a synchronous orbit, but not a geostationary
orbit. That is to say they would be launched so as to be
initially synchronized at a point 40 degrees north of the
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Equator. Due to the Earth's rotation about an inclined
axis, the satellite would tend to migrate between 40° north
latitude and 40° south latitude without any significant
east-west movement. Because the Earth is revolving around
the sun as well as rotating about its own axis, these
satellites would make the north-south-north round trip
travel in slightly under 24 hours. The north-south movement
of the satellites will create additional tracking problems
for receiver stations, and is serious enough to make the
tracking solution cost-effective only on the Navy's largest
ships. Again, however, this feature would increase surviva-
bility of the overall satellite system, and naval units in
the polar regions would now be capable of exchanging informa
tion through satellites. (FTSATCOM is currently planned
without any capability to operate in the polar regions.)
A great deal more information is available on the
survivability of communication satellites from numerous
Department of Defense agencies. Therefore, the author feels
that it is not necessary to discuss the situation any
further. In concluding this section on survivability, it
becomes apparent that when compared on an equal scale,
communication satellites offer many benefits not enjoyed
by HF radio in the world of survivability.
D. MAINTAINABILITY
Maintainability of RIIXS is a major factor contributing
to the overall performance of the system. Poor maintenance
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procedures would seriously jeopardize system effectiveness.
The major question at hand is whether it is easier to provide
maintenance for an EDP data file system located aboard ship
or for one located ashore.
As was pointed out earlier, computers that are located
aboard ships have to be built to strict military specifica-
tions. Also, they are normally tailor-made to perform a
specialized job. Therefore, any maintenance that was
performed on the system would have to be accomplished by
personnel specially trained for that system. Also, the
parts and some of the test equipment required for the system
would be specially designed for the system concerned. Computer
software as well as hardware would fall into this same cate-
gory.
Shipboard storage space for specialized computer system
parts is severely limited on Navy ships. In addition, all
spare parts stored aboard ship would be subject to accelerated
deterioration due to vibration, humidity and G-forces that
are not normally associated with shore storage spaces. To
maintain a shipboard EDP system, the naval supply system
will have to inventory thousands of specialized computer
parts around the world.
As an example, if a part were to go bad that was vital
to one of the onboard computers, the following might happen:
First, the ship's supply center would be searched; failing
there, the closest supply ship would be searched; failing
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there, the closest supply center would be notified to
supply the part; failing again, the requisition would be
forwarded to a supply center in CONUS. It might take as
long as several days to locate the proper replacement part
and several more to retrieve it from the supply system.
Of course, this whole example was based on the assumption
that working test equipment was available to detect the
malfunctioning part in the first place.
By placing the computers and EDP file system ashore,
the maintenance problem should be greatly simplified.
First of all, the shore-based system will be composed of
standard factory equipment. This in itself is very
beneficial. Not only will standard spare parts be readily
available, but individual part failure may be detected
sooner due to greater operating experience of similar
system components.
A system ashore has a variety of maintenance options
available. Maintenance performed by experienced factory
trained personnel has very obvious advantages over mainte-
nance performed at sea. This fact, coupled with the
increased supply of spare parts and factory support, leads
to the obvious conclusion that maintainability of a shore-





Historically, the Navy has always been concerned with
the problems of having enough qualified personnel to
operate its weapons systems. It is obvious that highly
trained personnel are required to operate the increasingly
sophisticated "support" systems as well as the weapons
systems themselves. The increasing reliance on EDP
equipment for automation and modernization within the Navy
has caused a tremendous demand for qualified personnel.
Communications systems are certainly no exception to the
trend. There is no denying the fact that personnel quali-
fied in the area of EDP will be paramount to the success of
any communication system.
The author contends that by maintaining the data base
ashore, as proposed by RIIXS, personnel manning problems
will be greatly eased. As was described earlier, a great
majority of the EDP equipment located at the CDCC will be
standard off-the-shelf equipment without additional military
specifications. This fact has three major beneficial points
First, the training of military personnel will be easily
standardized throughout the Navy. Second, the training
of military personnel could be contracted out to civilian
organizations, or even computer manufacturers' schools.
Thirdly, the personnel manning level of the CDCC could be
largely civilian rather than military. As an example, one
can look at the personnel manning level of a similar
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system-- IFDS. According to classified project reports on
IFDS, a substantial number of officer and enlisted personnel
are required to operate the system. No indication was made
of the use or attempted use of civilian personnel to operate
the system. RIIXS, on the other hand, can be designed to
operate almost entirely with civilian personnel, and only a
handful of supervisory military personnel.
This philosophy has several advantages. First, the
Navy does not have to invest large amounts of money into
fixed training assets such as buildings and computer equip-
ment. Because of this fact, the operational system can
be modified and improved without requiring costly changes
in training equipment. Second, EDP qualified personnel
can spend more time in operational billets vice educational
or training billets. As the Navy continues to reduce its
size and cost of operation, it is important that valuable
personnel serve in operational vice training billets.
Third, casualties among qualified military personnel at
sea represent a loss that cannot be easily replaced.
Considering the large civilian pool of EDP qualified
personnel in CONUS, an emergency manpower shortage does not
appear likely. Additionally, civilian personnel will be
employed under civil service, and hopefully more career
oriented than current enlisted personnel at the rate of E-4
and below.
The author feels that it is appropriate to compare
personnel manning levels of RIIXS to that of a NAVCOMSTA.
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As an example, NAVCOMSTA, San Francisco has virtually
replaced all military personnel with civilian personnel in
the area of EDP operations. The reduced manpower turnover
rate and increased experience with the equipment has
increased both effectiveness and efficiency in this area.
Therefore, it appears logical to assume that this same
type of superior performance by civilian personnel can be
expected in the operation of EDP equipment in the CDCC of
RIIXS.
F. DATA TRANSMISSION RATES
The rate at which information can be entered into and
retrieved from a data base depends on many factors: size,
location, organization of files, and type of equipment used.
Data transmission rates will be considered with the under-
standing of holding all variables constant except location
of the data base. Of primary concern is whether to locate
the data base aboard ship or in CONUS.
The speed at which information will be transmitted will
be near the speed of light. Therefore, only the trans-
mission path will affect the time it takes to transmit and
receive information. In the case of synchronous communica-
tion satellites, this delay is approximately one-fourth of
a second for a one-way transmission. Since the data base
in question is neither voice-oriented nor real-time-oriented,
this delay period is not a critical factor. In other words,
it is assumed that a NFC will not mind waiting a half second
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longer to receive information from a shore- located data
base than from a ship-located data base.
Neglecting time delay then, the real question is how
much information can be retrieved in a given time period.
If the data base is located aboard ship, then the information
exchange rate would be limited only by the mechanical device
used to print the retrieved information. Currently, this
would be in the neighborhood of 2000 words per minute for
standard shipboard equipment. (It is difficult to imagine
a need for a print speed greater than this to support a
single NFC.)
The major drawback to the data base located aboard ship
is the problem of updating the data base with current informa-
tion. There are two major areas of concern here. First
is the speed at which the data base could be updated, and
secondly, the problem of correlation and validation.
Currently, the most reliable means of updating would
be 75 and/or 100 word per minute radio teletype. For the
size of the data base as described in chapter II, a great
number of RTT's and corresponding HF channels would be
required to satisfy the updating requirement.
The immense task of correlating and validating the
information prior to entering it into the data file also
proposes a problem. If this chore were accomplished
prior to shore-ship transmission, then some type of head-
quarters similar to the CDCC would be required (just as in
RIIXS). If the correlation was not accomplished prior to
50

transmission, then two different problems arise.
First
is that a much higher information transfer
capacity will




second, the fact that both additional manpower
and space
would be required to correlate the data upon
reception
aboard ship.
If the data base is located ashore, then
obviously the
user is separated from his desired product by
a very real
barrier. The only way to overcome this barrier
is through
the use of a high-speed and very reliable means
of exchanging
information. Although at the present time no
such system
is available, FLTSATCOM will solve this problem
in the not
too distant future.
Assuming that FLTSATCOM is implemented according to
plans, the same assets will be available to the
NFC whether
the data base is located ashore or aboard ship.
This will
give the NFC the ability to use a 2,400 bps digital
data
link for transferring information from point to
point. The
basic question then becomes whether more digital
bits of
information must be transferred to update a shipboard
data
base system as compared to digital bits of information
transferred in response to a query from the NFC
through
RIIXS. The exact answer will be a command decision
based
on the value placed on the data base itself.
The author
feels that to answer this question now is above and
beyond
the scope of the thesis; and that it is only
necessary to
point out that this aspect should be considered by
personnel
responsible for building the system.
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There appears to be little doubt that no matter where
the data base is located, there will be major problems
associated with reliable high-speed data transmission
rates
.
G. DOLLAR COST RESOURCE ALLOCATION
To say that it is possible to put an exact dollar
cost on RIIXS at the present time is pushing the absurd.
The two largest unknowns happen to affect the two largest
dollar investments in the system. These two unknowns
are: the degree of success reached by FLTSATCOM and the
size and type of computer equipment needed to maintain
the NFC's data base.
Without FLTSATCOM or a similar satellite system,
RIIXS as proposed will not be possible. The high-speed
digital data links provided by synchronous satellites
are vital to the successful operation of RIIXS. Although
RIIXS needs the assets provided by FLTSATCOM, the oppo-
site is not true. Therefore, the development and imple-
mentation costs associated with FLTSATCOM cannot be
credited against RIIXS.
Other than initial development costs, the three major
cost areas are the NFCIT, CDCC, and personnel. The NFCIT
should be less difficult and much less expensive to install
aboard ship than IFDS. The lessons learned during the one-
year operational experience with IFDS should be applicable
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to RIIXS. The proposed equipment for the NFCIT and complete
installation costs should be less than one and one half
2
million dollars.
The most expensive part of the whole RIIXS system will
be the CDCC. The expenses here can be divided into two
major areas. The first area is the physical building
itself, and the second is the EDP equipment required to
maintain, the data base for the NFC.
The CDCC should be located in close proximity to a
FLTSATCOM ground terminal to increase transmission security,
reduce transmission losses, and reduce transmission costs.
Initially, all FLTSATCOM ground terminals will be located
at NAVCOMSTA's. This fact should help reduce initial
construction costs by at least providing the real estate
necessary to build the CDCC.
Construction of the building should be according to
the protective specifications of an important communica-
tions center, such as a NAVCOMSTA. The communication path
between the CDCC and the FLTSATCOM ground terminal can be
adequately satisfied by conventional coaxial cable. The
major concern will be in supplying security for the cable
itself.
The EDP equipment within the CDCC will be the most
expensive part of RIIXS. It is envisioned that at least




three computers will be required along with sophisticated
peripheral and display equipment. A more complete list of
equipment can be found in chapter II; it is estimated that
the costs will be several million dollars. Although the
costs appear high, the opportunity for total system
savings are great when compared to the costs of constructing
several floating CDCC's for all NFC's all the time.
Personnel costs are expected to be high and also to
increase with time as wage rates increase. It is antici-
pated that no more than 10 or 12 persons will be required
to operate the NFCIT while 25 or 30 will be required to
operate the CDCC. All the personnel in the NFCIT will be
military while only 20 or 30 per cent need to be in the
CDCC. In the area of personnel manning and job description,
the experience gained from IFDS should be drawn on heavily.
H. CONTRIBUTION TO COMMAND AND CONTROL
The concept of satellite communication, and RIIXS in
particular, offer tremendous potentials for improving both
the strategic and tactical aspects of command and control.
No longer will ships be confined to certain designated
routes for communication purposes. Traditional lines of
communication no longer exist with the establishment of
reliable satellite communications. Fleet commanders would
have the opportunity to operate their fleets in areas
chosen totally for military reasons vice communication
purposes for the first time in all of naval history. Every
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major campaign in the last thousand years, whether at
sea or on land, had to operate along established lines of
communication. Synchronous satellites provide the potential
for an umbrella of communication assets around the world,
and RIIXS provides the NFC with a mobile data base of up-
to-date vital information.
In contrast, current Navy policy advertises the location
of NFC's by allowing them to operate from World War II
vintage cruisers. They even announce the NFC's coming and
going by raising and lowering his flag. Such policy allows
the NFC and, in particular, flagships to become relatively
easy targets for enemy action. NFC's are given large
staffs and volumes of paper work for support. Putting all
this information together results in the designation of
NFC's and/or their flagships as high value targets for enemy
action. In the case of the American Navy, destruction of
the flagship results in the destruction of a large amount
of the NFC's decision making ability along with his
ability to communicate his decisions and orders.
On the other hand, the concept of RIIXS allows every
ship in the Navy with FLTSATCOM capability to become a
potential flagship with command and control capability
nearly equal to the original flagship capability. This
is because RIIXS allows the NFC to maintain a data base of
valuable information in a secure location in CONUS. This
information can then be retrieved by any naval vessel with
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FLTSATCOM capability. RIIXS once again allows every NFC
to operate with the freedom of movement once enjoyed by
Admiral Nelson and Commodore Perry.
Two very important facts arise from this newly acquired
freedom: command mobility and rapid command assumption.
Command mobility is interpreted as the ease with which a
NFC can move throughout his area of command whether at
sea or ashore. RIIXS will allow a NFC to travel incognito
throughout his whole area of command with virtually 100
per cent of the command capability that he would have on
his own flagship.
The enemy is now confronted with a high-value target
that is also highly mobile and elusive. If the NFC's
flagship is destroyed, his new flagship will be the closest
ship with a FLTSATCOM and RIIXS capability. He can now
carry out operations on a second ship much the same way
Commodore Perry did in the Battle of Lake Erie.
Updating the situation to current times, we can
examine what happened to the USS Newport News in 197 2. A
non-hostile explosion in the number two turret forced a
potential fleet flagship to retire from the fleet for
several months to undergo repairs. If the Newport News
had been a fleet flagship then a great deal of information
vital to the operation of the fleet would have been lost.
(If not, then where is the justification for 25-year-old
cruisers as flagships?) Had RIIXS been available at the
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time, the fleet would hardly have missed the Newport News '
departure as the fleet commander transferred to another ship
and carried on operations nearly as before.
The second big factor is rapid command assumption. In
the event of the death of the NFC, the next senior man in
the fleet will be able to assume command faster and more
decisively through satellite communications. Through RIIXS
he will have virtually all the same informatin that his
predecessor had even though their ships may be separated
by many miles. This ability of rapid command assumption
with near "complete information" of both a tactical and
strategic nature is an extremely valuable asset.
For those naval officers who believe fighting ships
will be around for some time to come, they should review
the Battle of Jutland. Admiral Jellicoe was unable to
direct a. vastly superior naval force into a decisive battle
against the smaller German naval force because of his
lack of control. He had command of his forces but he lacked
control of the situation due to poor (or no) communications
with the various elements of his force. He narrowly missed
the opportunity to completely annihilate the German naval
force and possibly to shorten World War I by one or two
years as a result of poor communications. If nothing else,
the Battle of Jutland is a dramatic example of how reliable





The Remote Interrogation Information Exchange System
concept is based on the premise that future NFC's will need
a data processing system to assist them in decision making.
The necessity for such an EDP system with a large data
base was presented in chapter I. It was shown that the
NFC's sphere of influence has grown enormously, yet the
time within which the NFC must make tactical decisions has
been reduced substantially. Additional factors that bear
heavily on the NFC are "volatile political situations" and
nuclear weapons capable of annihilating large portions of
his fleet with little or no warning.
In today's complex world, neither the NFC nor his
staff is capable of committing to memory all the vita]
items of information required for accurate and timely
decisions. Therefore, recording and filing systems will
be a requirement for the NFC of the future.
Approaches to this problem are clouded by the more
encumbering questions of where to put the data-file system.
Only two choices are really available: located remotely
from the NFC or in close proximity to him. RIIXS resolves
this question quite convincingly with the arguments presented
in chapter III. It is envisioned that the data-file system
of RIIXS would be large enough to require the use of large
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electronic computers to organize, update, and retrieve
information from the data base.
Seven basic criteria were used to compare such a
system located aboard ship with one remotely located
ashore. The seven areas are: reliability, survivability,
maintainability, data transmission rates, personnel man-
ning levels, dollar cost resource allocation, and contribu-
tion to command and control. In all but one, the RIIXS
concept of placing an EDP system ashore was superior to the
alternative shipboard system. RIIXS is a complete system
concept using the advantages of shore-based computers with
the ability to transfer vital information to the NFC through
the use of FLTSATCOM satellites.
A brief summary of the evaluation criteria demonstrates
that RIIXS is far superior to any data-file system yet pro-
posed in the support of NFC's. In the area of reliability,
RIIXS is vastly superior to an EDP system located aboard
ship for several reasons. First, computers located aboard
ships operate in a hostile environment. This means costly
additional design features and/or reduced computing
capability. Second, the availability of spare parts is
severely limited by the storage space aboard ships. All
factors of supply greatly favor a computer system located
ashore vice one located at sea. Third, both the level of
competence and number of personnel available to provide
maintenance are more plentiful ashore than at sea.
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The survivability of RIIXS is dependent mainly on the
ability of FLTSATCOM to survive hostile enemy action. Russia
is the only country with either the capability or the desire
to destroy orbiting satellites for at least the next ten
years, but the same is not true of a naval vessel carrying
a computer system. Any of a large number of potential
enemies, or even elements of nature, are capable of destroy-
ing the effectiveness of a ship-based computer system. If,
for no other reasons than the fact that ships catch fire,
have internal explosions, and occasionally sink, the author
feels that RIIXS has a higher degree of survivability than
a shipboard computer system.
The ability to perform proper maintenance is crucial
to the overall effectiveness of any system. A shipboard
computer system suffers from some of the same problems
listed under reliability: shortage of spare parts,
shortage of qualified personnel, hostile operating environ-
ment, and specialized equipment. These four problem areas
are nearly eliminated by the Central Data Control Center
(CDCC) of RIIXS.
The personnel manning problems of a sophisticated
computer system at sea are tremendous. The Navy is continu-
ally fighting the problem of maintaining adequate numbers
of qualified personnel. The more sophisticated and more
specialized the system, the more difficult the problem.
RIIXS reduces this problem by placing the most complicated
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part of the system ashore. In this way, factory- trained
civilian personnel will be in large supply for both
maintenance and operator positions.
The data transmission rate for RIIXS is the 2400 bps
channels provided by FLTSATCOM. This rate is substantially
faster than the conventional 100-word teletype used in HF
communications; however, a very large number of messages
will be sent using RIIXS. The major question for considera
tion is : Would more time be used answering queries through
RIIXS at 2400 bps than would be used in updating an EDP
data base using HF 100-word-per-minute teletype? Even if
the answer were to be in favor of putting the computer
system aboard ship, the other six areas greatly favor RIIXS
and would overshadow this point.
Dollar cost resource allocation is a very difficult
question because of "technical unknowns" and political
implications. There should be little argument to the
statement that it is cheaper to build a computer system
ashore than to build one aboard ship. Two very dramatic
examples of the costs involved with placing a computer
system aboard ship are NTDS and IFDS.
The contributions of FLTSATCOM and RIIXS to naval
command and control are as important and dynamic as has
been the introduction of HF radio and the digital computer.
FLTSATCOM has the potential to provide a worldwide umbrella
of communication assets for naval vessels. RIIXS, in
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effect, has the potential for providing the NFC with a
mobile data base of up-to-date vital information.
The concept of RIIXS is a capability never before
experienced by the Navy. Because of this, some naval
officers may consider it a luxury. As a result of this
research, however, it is believed that RIIXS is not a
luxury but rather an integral part of command and control
that should be incorporated into the naval structure as
early as possible. Those officers who feel reliable
communications are an expensive luxury should ask them-
selves about the Pueblo, the Liberty and the "EC-121."
For example, RIIXS could have provided an invaluable
service during the "Pueblo incident." The RIIXS data base
could have told what the USS Pueblo was, its mission, its
speed, its armament, crew complement, and political implica-
tions surrounding it. The type and strength of North
Korean land, sea and air forces in the area, and their order
of battle would also have been available. Of monumental
importance to the NFC would have been information about
"friendly forces" and their commands available to assist
the Pueblo . In addition, FLTSATCOM would have provided
reliable and secure communications between the Pueblo and
all commands concerned.
Certain personnel will argue that those circumstances,
and in particular the " Pueblo incident," will not happen
again. Therefore, there is no need to provide sophisticated
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communication systems such as RIIXS and FLTSATCOM to aid
command and control. There is only one way to guarantee
that these incidents do not happen again and that is not
to supply the enemy an American Navy with which to prey
upon. If there is to be an American Navy to patrol the
seas and protect the homeland, then it should have the tools
to accomplish the job effectively and honorably.
An obscure and maybe overlooked adversary to reliable
and secure communications is the naval bureaucracy itself.
Naval organizations and commands are planned around estab-
lished communication links. If there is a radical change
to those communication links, a certain amount of change
must be reflected in the existing naval command structure.
Because of this, a certain amount of resistance to FLTSATCOM
and RIIXS, in particular, will emanate from a resistance to
change within the Navy itself.
RIIXS was not conceived as a static system to serve
only one commander. It is both possible and desirable
to expand RIIXS capabilities to lower levels of operational
command. As an example, RIIXS could be implemented in
several steps: Step one would be for the numbered fleet
commanders; step two for the task force commanders; step
three for the group commanders; step four would be for the
unit commanders, and step five for the element commanders.
A great deal of argument will continue in favor of the
various commanders being in personal control of their own
private data bases of information. But it is not physically
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or financially possible to supply all the various force
commanders with private data bases and expect them all to
perform as well as a single CDCC as described by RIIXS.
Under the author's concept of RIIXS, the NFC will maintain
operational control of RIIXS at all times.
A very important factor that should not be overlooked
and certainly must be taken into account during the
decision making process is that both FLTSATCOM and RIIXS
have very real adaptations for civilian use. This is true
both in the development stage and in the event of a general
disarmament. FLTSATCOM and RIIXS have the ability to
serve the nation both from a military and a civilian stand-
point. This is not true for many of the multi-million
dollar weapon systems currently under construction.
In less than five years, it will be possible to purchase
and launch synchronous communication satellites for less
than it now costs to purchase one F-14 with spare parts.
These two military items may be equal in price, but they
certainly are not equal in the service they can provide
to the Navy or even the nation as a whole. Current cost
figures indicate that it would be possible to completely
implement FLTSATCOM for approximately the same costs as
one additional F-14 squadron. When decisions like this
have to be made by high-ranking officials, serious atten-
tion should be focused on the question: Do we need addi-
tional weapon systems, or do we need more support systems
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to make our current weapons more effective? FLTSATCOM
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